Returns to Mobility in the Transition to a Market Economy

In spite of ongoing dramatic changes in labor market structure, transitional economies display rather low worker flows across sectors and occupations. Such low mobility can be explained by low returns to job changes as well as by market segmentation in the allocation of job offers. We develop an econometric model which enables us to characterize intertemporal changes in probabilities of dismissal, remuneration, and offer arrival rates on the basis of information on observed transitions and wage payments. The model is estimated using data from the Polish Labor Force Survey. Our results indicate a significant degree of segmentation in the allocation of job offers and more stability in public sector versus private sector jobs. Our model can also be used for policy experiments. In particular, we infer that reductions of 10 per cent in the generosity of unemployment benefits will not significantly boost outflows from the unemployment state. These findings support explanations for low mobility in transitional economies, which are based on informational failures, and high costs of moving from public to private enterprises for those with high levels of job tenure and labor market experience in the public sector.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39604/2/wp217.pd

Wall-thickness changes predicted in hollow-drawn tubing

Hollow-tube drawing or tube sinking theory is based on the concept of continuous distribution of dislocations. Material composition, parameter influence, and die-angle are determining factors in derivation of the theoretical model

Returns to Mobility in the Transition to a Market Economy

In spite of ongoing dramatic changes in labor market structure, transitional economies display rather low worker flows across sectors and occupations. Such low mobility can be explained by low returns to job changes as well as by market segmentation in the allocation of job offers. We develop an econometric model which enables us to characterize intertemporal changes in probabilities of dismissal, remuneration, and offer arrival rates on the basis of information on observed transitions and wage payments. The model is estimated using data from the Polish Labor Force Survey. Our results indicate a significant degree of segmentation in the allocation of job offers and more stability in public sector versus private sector jobs. Our model can also be used for policy experiments. In particular, we infer that reductions of 10 per cent in the generosity of unemployment benefits will not significantly boost outflows from the unemployment state. These findings support explanations for low mobility in transitional economies, which are based on informational failures, and high costs of moving from public to private enterprises for those with high levels of job tenure and labor market experience in the public sector.worker flows, returns to mobility, market segmentation

New Methods for Analyzing Structural Models of Labor Force Dynamics

This paper takes a first step toward developing econometric models for the structural analysis of labor force dynamics. Our analysis is presented in continuous time, although most of the points raised here can be applied to discrete time models. We show that in previous attempts to estimate "structural" models of job search, a key source of information necessary to identify certain structural parameters has been neglected. We discuss the conditions under which structural search models can be estimated. In particular, the wage offer distribution must be recoverable -- i.e., it must be the case that the parameters of the untruncated wage offer distribution be estimable from the truncated accepted wage distribution. The wage offer distribution must be assumed to belong to a parametric family. Estimates of structural parameters are shown to be sensitive to the distributional assumption made. A partial equilibrium two state model of employment dynamics is estimated, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. We find employment and nonemployment rates implied by the structural parameter estimates to be generally consistent with those observed for the population of young males.

Electromigration early resistance increase measurements

An early resistance change measurement set-up, using an AC bridge technique, has been developed, and measurements have been performed. Large sample-to-sample variations occur. The characteristic time for the resistance change curve is shorter for resistance increase (under current stress) than for resistance decay (during recovery)

Are Unemployment and Out of the Labor Force Behaviorally Distinct Labor Force States?

This paper formulates and tests the hypothesis that the categories unemployed and out of the labor force are behaviorally distinct labor force states. Our empirical results indicate that they are. In the empirically relevant range the exit rate from unemployment to employment exceeds the exit rate from out of the labor force to employment. This evidence is shown to be consistent with a simple job search model of productive unemployment with log concave wage offer distributions. We prove that if unemployed workers receive job offers more frequently than workers out of the labor force, and if wage offer distributions are log concave, the exit rate from unemployment to employment exceeds the exit rate from out of the labor force to employment.

Modes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment

We formulate a model of household behavior in which cooperation is costly and in which these costs vary across households. Some households rationally decide to behave noncooperatively, which in our context is an efficient outcome. An intriguing feature of the model is that, while the welfare of the spouses is continuous in the state variables, labor supply decisions are not. Small changes in state variables may result in large changes in labor supplies when the household switches its mode of behavior. We estimate the model using a nationally representative sample of Italian households and find that the costly cooperation model signfificantly outperforms a noncooperative model. This suggests the possibility of attaining large gains in aggregate labor supply by adopting policies which promote cooperative household behavior.Household Time Allocation, Nash Bargaining, Nash Equilibrium; Maximum Likelihood.

Household Time Allocation and Models of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts

We make the point that a flexible specification of spousal preferences and household production technology precludes the possibility of using revealed preference data on household time allocations to determine the manner in which spouses interact. Under strong, but standard, assumptions regarding marriage market equilibria, marital sorting patterns can be used essentially as "out of sample" information that allows us to assess whether household behavior is cooperative. We use a sample of households drawn from a recent wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and find some evidence supporting the view that households behave in a cooperative manner.Bilateral Matching, Household Time Allocation, Nash Bargaining

Welfare effects of fixed and percentage-expressed child support awards

Over the last decade a large number of states have significantly altered their legal statutes concerning the disposition of divorce cases involving children. In particular, many states have increasingly employed percentage-expressed orders in which child support obligations in a given period are determined as a proportion of the contemporaneous income of the noncustodial parent. In contrast to more traditional systems in which obligations were set in fixed nominal terms at the time of the divorce settlement and were infrequently (or never) updated, the dynamic system has the advantages of allowing children (and the custodial parent) an opportunity to share in the general income gains experienced by the noncustodial parent over the life cycle and of possibly alleviating some noncompliance problems. In this paper we conduct a rather extensive theory-based empirical investigation of the effects of these systems on the income process for divorced fathers and the child support transfer decision. We estimate a flexible statistical model for the income- generation process for divorced fathers which encompasses the period both before and after the divorce. We interpret the estimates from this model to indicate small behavioral effects of the type of order on postdivorce income, but nonrandom assignment (in terms of the means and variances of predivorce income) into the percentage-expressed-order state. Our analysis of the effects of the order type on child support transfers is divided into two parts. In the first, a "reduced form" analysis, we investigate whether or not the divorced father's regime defined as the order type and withholding status can be considered exogenous vis-a-vis the transfer decision, and examine the relative effects of the various regimes on the transfer rate. We further attempt to investigate order-type effects on compliance in the context of a structural model of the compliance decision. The results of the two analyses are for the most part consistent. Percentage orders are generally associated with lower compliance rates, though withholding tends to alleviate the problem. The highest compliance rates are associated with fixed orders coupled with withholding.

An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance Provision and Wage Determination

We investigate the e_ect of employer-provided health insurance on job mobility rates and economic welfare. In particular, we develop and estimate an equilibrium model of wage and health insurance determination that yields implications that are empirically observed. Namely, not all jobs provide health insurance and jobs with insurance pay higher wages than those without insurance. Using data from the 1990 to 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, we find that jobs that do provide health insurance last almost five times longer than jobs that do not. While this implies that the mobility rate for jobs without insurance is significantly higher than the mobility rate for jobs with insurance, this di_erence is welfare enhancing since jobs with health insurance are more productive jobs. Furthermore, simulations reveal that decreasing the health insurance premium paid by employers increases the steady state health insurance coverage rate, decreases the unemployment rate, but may or may not lead to productivity gains in the economy.HEALTH INSURANCE; EQUILIBRIUM MODELS; WAGE BARGAINING; JOB MOBILITY